Security for the Energy and Utilities Sector: defending critical infrastructure against APTs and ransomware
How Decripte detects intrusions in control networks, contains attacks before they become physical impact and structures the defense of OT/ICS environments in power generators, transmitters and distributors.
Direct answer
To protect the energy and utilities sector, you must treat operational technology (OT) as a security domain of its own, separate from corporate IT: rigorously segment the control networks (SCADA/ICS) based on the zones-and-conduits model of IEC 62443, eliminate direct connectivity between the internet and the plant-floor environment, monitor 24x7 both IT traffic and industrial-protocol traffic (Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850) with a SOC capable of reading those packets, and maintain a rehearsed incident response plan that prioritizes continuity of supply and physical safety over the mere removal of malware. Decripte delivers this defense by combining a 24x7 SOC with OT visibility, Incident Response with a containment SLA of up to 1 hour, Pentest of industrial environments and Compliance aligned with ISO 27001, IEC 62443 and the regulatory requirements of the Brazilian power sector (ANEEL/ONS) and the LGPD.
24/7
SOC monitoring IT and OT
<=1h
Containment SLA in incidents
IEC 62443
Defense model for ICS/OT
ISO 27001
Compliance deployed
In summary
- ›The risk in the power sector is not just data loss: an attack on SCADA/ICS can cause supply interruption, equipment damage and risk to life — which is why containment must happen before physical impact.
- ›Effective defense starts with segmentation: separating IT from OT into zones and conduits (IEC 62443), with an industrial DMZ, data diodes where applicable and no direct route from the internet to the plant floor.
- ›Monitoring OT requires a SOC that understands industrial protocols (Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850) and the expected behavior of the processes, not just IT signatures.
- ›Geopolitically motivated APTs spend months in silent reconnaissance; detection depends on behavioral baselining, not on blocking a single IOC.
- ›Decripte combines a 24x7 SOC, Incident Response with containment <=1h, industrial Pentest and Compliance (ISO 27001/IEC 62443) to cover the complete OT defense cycle.
- ›Start with a free diagnosis at decripte.com.br/intelligence-center to map exposure before an incident forces the decision.
Cibersegurança para Energy and Utilities
How Decripte detects intrusions in control networks, contains attacks before they become physical impact and structures the defense of OT/ICS environments in power generators, transmitters and distributors.
Why the energy sector is the highest-value target for advanced adversaries
Energy and utilities top the list of national critical infrastructure. A distributor, a transmitter, a generator or a sanitation operator is not just another company with data to protect: it is a system whose functioning sustains hospitals, industries, telecommunications, transport and the daily life of millions of people. This centrality is exactly what makes the sector a priority target for the most capable adversaries — state-sponsored groups seeking strategic pre-positioning in control networks, and ransomware operators who know that the pressure to restore supply maximizes the chance of payment.
What distinguishes this sector from a bank or a retailer is the nature of the final asset. In corporate IT, the worst scenario is usually data leakage or the unavailability of a system. In OT — the operational technology that commands substations, breakers, reclosers, turbines, pumps and meters — the worst scenario is physical: undue opening of breakers, equipment overload, protection manipulation, large-scale supply interruption and, in extreme cases, irreversible damage to extremely high-cost equipment with long replacement lead times. Information security, here, merges with operational safety and with the physical safety of people.
The impact is not abstract
In OT, a malicious command does not just generate an alert — it generates an effect in the real world. That is why the sector's defense strategy inverts IT's usual priority: process continuity and physical safety come before malware removal. Contain first, eradicate later.
There is also a structural aggravating factor. Much of the energy industrial fleet runs on legacy systems — PLCs, RTUs and HMIs designed one or two decades ago, with industrial protocols born without authentication or encryption, in an era when physical isolation ("air gap") was considered sufficient protection. That isolation has, in practice, disappeared: digitalization brought connectivity for smart metering, substation automation, supplier remote maintenance and integration with corporate systems. The attack surface grew while the technological base remained fragile by design.
OT is not IT by another name
OT environments prioritize process availability and integrity over confidentiality, operate with rigid maintenance windows, do not tolerate arbitrary restarts and use protocols that often do not support frequent patching. Applying the IT playbook without adaptation breaks the operation. The defense must be designed for the industrial domain.
The threat map of the power and utilities sector
Understanding what you are defending against is the first step of any strategy. In the energy and utilities sector, five vectors concentrate the greatest risk, and they rarely act in isolation — a real intrusion usually chains several of them.
SCADA/ICS and ransomware in critical infrastructure
The heart of the operation is the supervision and control systems. SCADA and ICS translate decisions into physical commands. An attacker who reaches this plane can tamper with setpoints, falsify readings sent to operators to mask a malicious maneuver, or issue direct commands to breakers and reclosers. Protocols like Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 were conceived for implicit trust: whoever speaks on the network is, by definition, authorized. Ransomware worsens the picture: even when it does not reach OT directly, the contamination of corporate IT forces the operator to preventively shut down the IT/OT interconnection — paralyzing billing, dispatch, telemetry and operation centers. Specialized groups calibrate campaigns for the moment of greatest pressure, knowing that every hour of interruption has an extremely high regulatory, financial and reputational cost.
Advanced persistent threats (APT)
They are the most dangerous adversaries because they are in no hurry. A geopolitically motivated APT seeks durable and stealthy access to control networks, often without any immediate destructive action — the goal is pre-positioning, being ready to act at a moment of tension. These actors do reconnaissance for months, live off the land ("living off the land") using the environment's own legitimate tools to leave no malware trace, and prioritize valid credentials over noisy exploits. Detecting them is not a matter of blocking an IOC; it is a matter of recognizing what is anomalous in behavior.
Distribution sabotage and smart-meter compromise
The modernization of grids — distribution automation, remotely controlled reclosers, smart metering — has multiplied the connected endpoints. Each smart meter, each communication gateway, each concentrator is an asset that, if compromised at scale, opens a path to metering fraud, aggregate-demand manipulation and, at the extreme, coordinated sabotage. The defense must consider not only the large control centers, but the massively distributed edge of the grid.
The five vectors every energy operator must address
- ✓SCADA/ICS systems without segmentation and with protocols lacking authentication
- ✓Ransomware that paralyzes the operation even without touching OT directly
- ✓APTs seeking stealthy and durable pre-positioning in the control networks
- ✓Sabotage of distribution grids via remotely controlled automation
- ✓Compromise at scale of smart meters and the grid edge
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Anatomy of APT access to the control network of a distributor
Anonymized real-world example
The case below is an anonymized real-world example built from real attack patterns against energy infrastructure. it does not identify the client nor any identifiable real incident. It serves to show, step by step, how an advanced intrusion evolves and how Decripte acts in each phase.
Imagine a regional-scale power distributor. Corporate IT is modern and reasonably protected. The OT environment — operation centers, automated substations, SCADA system — was digitalized over the years, but its security evolved more slowly than its connectivity. There is an interconnection between IT and OT for telemetry collection and for supplier remote maintenance. It is precisely at this seam that the adversary enters.
The entry point
The intrusion begins far from the plant floor. A spear-phishing email aimed at an automation engineer delivers credentials to an APT operator. Instead of deploying noisy malware, the attacker uses these valid credentials to access the maintenance VPN — a legitimate path, designed for suppliers. From there, the movement is slow, patient and disguised as normal administrative activity. It is the kind of access that signature-based tools alone would never flag.
Why most defenses fail here
The adversary did not bring a virus to be detected: they brought a real credential and used tools that already existed in the environment. Without a behavioral baseline and without monitoring of the IT/OT interconnection, this access can go unnoticed for months — exactly what the APT wants.
The defense, in this scenario, depends on something many operators do not have: continuous visibility over who talks to whom between IT and OT, and the ability to recognize that an access pattern — although authenticated — is anomalous. That is where the 24x7 SOC with OT competence comes in. The timeline in the case section details how Decripte conducts the response from detection to lessons learned.
Decripte's response: contain before physical impact
Responding to an incident in an energy environment requires a discipline that does not fit the traditional IT playbook. The primary goal is not to "clean the machine" as fast as possible — it is to ensure that no malicious action reaches the physical plane of the process while the threat is investigated and safely removed. This profoundly changes the order of operations.
The priority inversion that defines OT response
In IT, you isolate and eradicate. In OT, you contain the capability to cause physical harm first, preserve the operation of the process, and only then eradicate — always within windows that do not compromise supply or the safety of field crews.
In practice, containing before physical impact means cutting off the attacker's path to the critical commands without necessarily shutting down the operation. It can mean isolating the IT/OT interconnection, revoking compromised credentials, placing the affected cell into supervised manual operation mode, or inserting specific blocking rules at the industrial perimeter — all coordinated with the plant's operations team, never over its head.
Coordination with operations is not optional
Every containment action in OT is validated together with the process operators. Shutting down a segment or forcing manual mode without coordination can cause exactly the physical incident being avoided. Decripte works side by side with the operator's technical team, with decisions recorded and reversible.
Continuous monitoring: the SOC that understands industrial protocols
Segmenting reduces the surface, but no segmentation is perfect and no perimeter is impassable in the face of valid credentials. That is why continuous monitoring is the layer that makes the difference between an incident detected in hours and a pre-positioning that lasts months. And monitoring OT is not simply pointing the IT tools at another network.
What makes OT monitoring different
A traditional SOC sees IPs, ports and malware signatures. A SOC with OT competence reads Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 — it understands when a breaker-open command is outside the expected operational pattern, when a telemetry value has been falsified, or when a device starts talking to someone it never talked to. Detection is behavioral, based on the process, not just on the network.
Decripte's 24x7 SOC establishes a baseline of the environment's normal behavior — which devices communicate, with which protocols, in which windows, with which typical values — and fires alerts on deviations. It is this approach that detects the APT in our anonymized real-world example: not by the malware (there was none), but by the anomalous access pattern coming from the maintenance VPN at times and in sequences that do not match an engineer's real behavior. Operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, the SOC ensures that the night or weekend window — preferred by attackers — is as covered as business hours.
Early detection changes the outcome
The difference between a scare and an operational catastrophe is usually time. The earlier the intrusion is identified, the shorter the path the attacker travels and the more containment options without physical impact exist. Continuous monitoring buys that time.
What would an incident in energy and utilities cost? See your real risk before it happens.
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Compliance and the regulatory context of the Brazilian power sector
Security and compliance go hand in hand, but they are not the same thing. Well-done compliance is the translation of good security practices into processes that are auditable, sustainable and defensible before regulators, clients and the board itself. In the energy sector, the relevant framework combines consolidated international standards with Brazilian sector and legal requirements.
The compliance framework Decripte implements for energy
- ✓ISO/IEC 27001 as the information security management system
- ✓IEC 62443 as the technical reference for industrial automation systems security (OT/ICS)
- ✓NIST Cybersecurity Framework to structure identify, protect, detect, respond and recover
- ✓LGPD for the processing of personal data — relevant above all in the relationship with consumers and in metering
- ✓Alignment with the applicable sector guidelines in the regulated energy environment (ANEEL, ONS)
A note of precision: the LGPD applies to the sector as to any organization that processes personal data — and distributors process a lot of it, from consumers to metered consumption. The oversight and infra-legal regulation of data protection fall to the ANPD, the National Data Protection Authority. The sector regulation of continuity, quality and operation of the power system involves bodies such as ANEEL and the ONS. Decripte structures compliance respecting this division: personal data through the LGPD/ANPD lens, operation and OT environment under ISO 27001 and IEC 62443, and attention to the sector obligations applicable to each agent.
Compliance is not a paper checklist
Certificates on the wall do not stop an APT. Decripte treats compliance as the product of security that truly works — controls effectively implemented, tested by Pentest and monitored by the SOC. The document is the consequence, not the goal.
Industrial pentest: validating the defense before the adversary does
The only way to know whether a defense works is to test it with the mindset of someone who wants to break it. In the energy sector, this requires care that distinguishes professional testing from dangerous amateurism: you never run against production OT environments a test that could bring down a critical process. Decripte's industrial Pentest is planned around this frontier.
The work combines assessment of corporate IT and its contact points with OT, simulation of realistic attack chains — starting from a successful phishing attack, as in this anonymized real-world example, and pursuing the path to the industrial interconnection — and the analysis of the segmentation architecture to find routes that theory did not foresee. When the test reaches OT components, it is conducted preferably in staging environments, replicas or agreed windows, with passive techniques and controlled validations, always coordinated with operations.
What an industrial pentest reveals
Credentials reused between IT and OT, industrial firewall rules more permissive than designed, forgotten yet active supplier accesses, segmentation that exists in the diagram but not in the real configuration. These are gaps that only appear when someone with an adversary profile looks for them — before the real adversary does.
The pentest findings feed directly back into the segmentation, the SOC's monitoring rules and the response plans — closing the loop between testing, fixing and watching. It is this continuous feedback that turns a security snapshot into a defense that improves over time.
From spot response to continuous defense
The risk in the energy sector is not static. Digitalization advances, new suppliers connect, the grid edge expands with more smart metering, and adversaries — especially state-sponsored ones — continually refine their techniques. A defense set up once and forgotten ages fast. That is why Decripte approaches the sector as a permanent cycle, not as a project with an end date.
This cycle unites the four fronts in a single motion: the 24x7 SOC watches and detects, Incident Response contains and eradicates when something gets through, the Pentest validates and exposes gaps, and Compliance sustains governance and auditability. Each incident, each test and each new connected asset feeds the tuning of the other fronts. The result is a security posture that keeps pace with the evolution of the threat instead of chasing after it.
Start before the incident
The worst time to discover that the IT/OT interconnection is exposed is during an attack. Decripte's free diagnosis, at decripte.com.br/intelligence-center, maps your operation's exposure and prioritizes where to act — with no commitment and before urgency takes away your time to decide calmly.
For operators that already recognize the risk and want to structure the defense, the path begins at decripte.io/start or through a direct conversation at /contato. The combination of services is designed for the reality of each agent — generator, transmitter, distributor or utility — and for the maturity stage the operation is in today.
Anatomy of APT access to the control network of a distributor (anonymized real-world example)
Real, de-identified example
Anonymized real-world example (client not identified). A regional power distributor with mature corporate IT and an OT environment digitalized over the years. There is an interconnection between IT and OT for telemetry and supplier remote maintenance. An APT operator with a strategic pre-positioning motivation obtains, via spear-phishing against an automation engineer, valid credentials to access the maintenance VPN — and begins a slow, stealthy movement toward the SCADA control network.
Detection
Decripte's 24x7 SOC, operating with a behavioral baseline of the environment, identifies an anomalous pattern: accesses via the maintenance VPN at times and in sequences incompatible with the real behavior of the incumbent engineer, with attempts to enumerate devices at the IT/OT interconnection. There was no malware to detect — the signal was behavioral. The alert is classified as critical and escalated in minutes, outside business hours.
Triage and analysis
The Incident Response team confirms the credential compromise, maps the attacker's current reach (still restricted to IT and the interconnection edge, with no commands issued to SCADA) and establishes, together with the distributor's operations, the containment perimeter that would not interrupt supply. The priority is to cut off the path to the physical commands before any other action.
Containment
Within the SLA of up to 1 hour, Decripte isolates the IT/OT interconnection at the industrial DMZ, revokes the compromised credential and the attacker's active sessions, and blocks the remote-access broker. The potentially exposed control cell is placed into supervised manual operation mode, coordinated with the operators. The attacker loses the path to the physical plane — without a single breaker having been improperly operated.
Eradication
A forensic investigation reconstructs the entire chain: from the phishing email to the credentials, to the VPN access, to the lateral movement. All accounts and keys touched are rotated, the phishing entry point is closed, abused legitimate tools ("living off the land") are identified and their anomalous use blocked, and the indicators are propagated to all monitoring.
Recovery
The IT/OT interconnection is re-established in a controlled and gradual way, with reinforced monitoring and integrity validation of the control devices' configuration. The operation returns from manual to automatic mode only after confirmation that the environment is clean and that no command or setpoint was tampered with during the incident window.
Lessons and hardening
The incident feeds the defense: review of the segmentation architecture to reduce the interconnection surface, deployment of mandatory MFA and session recording on supplier access, new behavioral detection rules in the SOC calibrated by what was learned, and an industrial Pentest targeted at validating that the exploited route was effectively closed.
Outcome with Decripte
Because the intrusion was detected early — by behavior, not by signature — and contained in up to 1 hour, the attacker never reached the capability to cause physical impact. There was no supply interruption, equipment damage or undue maneuver. The distributor emerged from the incident with the APT eradicated, the IT/OT interconnection redesigned with stricter segmentation, continuous monitoring calibrated by the real episode and a validated response plan. What could have been a large-scale sabotage became a contained, documented event turned into a structural defense improvement.
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How Decripte responds to an incident in the energy sector
Incident response in energy and utilities follows a specific discipline: the absolute priority is to prevent any malicious action from reaching the physical plane of the process. Contain the capability to cause harm first, preserve the operation, eradicate safely. All actions are coordinated with the plant's operations team and recorded for forensic and regulatory purposes.
- 24x7 detection and triage: the SOC identifies the deviation — often behavioral, not by signature — classifies the severity and escalates immediately, at any time, day or in the early hours.
- Reach and impact analysis: the team maps how far the attacker got, whether there is risk to the OT environment and which containment perimeter protects without interrupting supply.
- Containment with an SLA of up to 1 hour: isolation of the IT/OT interconnection, revocation of credentials and sessions, blocking of remote accesses and, when necessary, transition of the affected cell to supervised manual mode — always with operations.
- Coordination with the operations team: no OT containment action is executed over the operators' heads; each decision is validated, reversible and recorded to avoid provoking the very physical incident being prevented.
- Eradication and forensics: reconstruction of the entire attack chain, rotation of compromised credentials and keys, closing of the entry point and blocking of the abused tools.
- Controlled recovery: gradual re-establishment of the operation with integrity validation of the control devices and confirmation that no setpoint or command was tampered with.
- Communication and regulatory support: support to the organization in documenting the incident and in the required communications — including, when personal data is involved, handling in accordance with the LGPD and possible notification to the ANPD.
- Post-incident hardening: the lessons feed segmentation, the SOC's monitoring rules and a targeted Pentest to confirm the exploited route was closed.
How Decripte structures the defense of an energy environment
Structuring security in OT is building layers that reinforce one another: an architecture that reduces the surface, monitoring that sees what the architecture does not block, tests that validate everything and governance that sustains the defense over time. The pillars below work as a system, not as isolated initiatives.
Visibility and inventory of OT assets
You cannot protect what you do not know. The starting point is a complete inventory of the industrial assets — PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, gateways, metering concentrators — with a mapping of how they communicate and with which protocols. This inventory is the basis of every segmentation and detection decision.
Segmentation by zones and conduits (IEC 62443)
Separation of the environment into levels of decreasing trust, with an industrial DMZ mediating 100% of the traffic between IT and OT, elimination of any direct route from the internet to the plant floor, supplier remote access via a controlled broker with MFA and session recording, and data diodes where the flow must be physically one-way.
Continuous monitoring with a 24x7 SOC competent in OT
Behavioral detection based on the process, reading the industrial protocols (Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850) and baselining the environment's normal behavior. The SOC operates uninterruptedly, covering the night and weekend windows preferred by attackers.
Offensive validation through industrial Pentest
Tests conducted with an adversarial mindset and the care never to compromise critical production processes — preferably in staging, replicas or agreed windows. The findings feed back into segmentation, monitoring rules and response plans.
Governance, compliance and response readiness
ISO 27001 as the management system, IEC 62443 as the OT technical reference, NIST CSF to structure the security cycle, LGPD/ANPD for personal data and attention to the sector obligations (ANEEL/ONS). Rehearsed response plans ensure that, when the incident comes, the reaction is already trained.
Recommended plans for Energy and Utilities
24x7 SOC
Continuous monitoring of IT and OT with industrial-protocol reading and behavioral detection — it is what catches stealthy APTs and ransomware in the night and weekend windows, before they reach physical control.
See plan →Incident Response
Containment with an SLA of up to 1 hour and OT-specific discipline: cut off the path to physical impact before eradicating, coordinated with the plant's operations — essential when every hour of interruption has an extremely high regulatory and operational cost.
See plan →Pentest
Offensive validation of IT/OT segmentation and of the contact points with the industrial environment, revealing real attack routes (reused credentials, forgotten supplier accesses, permissive industrial firewall) before the adversary finds them.
See plan →Compliance
Structuring aligned with ISO 27001 and IEC 62443, with personal-data handling under LGPD/ANPD and attention to the sector obligations (ANEEL/ONS), turning effective controls into processes that are auditable and defensible before regulators and the board.
See plan →Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between protecting corporate IT and protecting the OT environment of an energy operator?
Corporate IT prioritizes data confidentiality and tolerates frequent restarts and patches. The OT environment — which commands substations, breakers and turbines — prioritizes availability and integrity of the physical process, operates with rigid maintenance windows and uses industrial protocols that often were born without authentication. Applying the IT playbook without adaptation can bring down the operation. Decripte designs the defense specifically for the industrial domain, based on IEC 62443.
What is IEC 62443 and why does it matter for the energy sector?
It is the main international standard for the security of industrial automation and control systems. It guides the separation of the environment into zones and conduits with decreasing levels of trust, from the plant floor to corporate IT. For an energy operator, it is the technical reference that structures the segmentation between IT and OT, the industrial DMZ and the access controls to the control environment.
How do you detect an APT that does not use malware and enters with valid credentials?
Not through signatures or IOC blocking, but through behavioral detection. Decripte's SOC establishes a baseline of what is normal — which devices talk to one another, with which protocols, in which windows — and alerts on the deviation. An authenticated access coming from the maintenance VPN at atypical times and in atypical sequences is the kind of signal that reveals a stealthy intrusion even without any malicious file present.
Can a Pentest bring down my industrial operation?
A professional Pentest, no. Decripte never runs against production OT environments a test that could compromise a critical process. When the work reaches OT components, it is conducted preferably in staging, replicas or agreed windows, with passive techniques and controlled validations, always coordinated with operations. The danger is in the amateur test, not in the planned one.
What is Decripte's containment SLA in an energy incident?
Incident Response operates with a containment SLA of up to 1 hour. In the energy sector, containment has its own discipline: the priority is to cut off the attacker's path to the physical commands before any other action, preserving the operation and coordinating each decision with the plant team.
Does the LGPD apply to a power distributor?
Yes. The LGPD applies to any organization that processes personal data, and distributors process a lot of it — from consumer registrations to metered consumption. The oversight and infra-legal regulation of data protection fall to the ANPD. Decripte structures compliance handling personal data through the LGPD/ANPD lens and the operational environment under ISO 27001 and IEC 62443, with attention to the applicable sector obligations.
Do smart meters and distribution automation increase the risk?
Yes. Each smart meter, gateway and concentrator is a connected endpoint that, if compromised at scale, opens a path to metering fraud, aggregate-demand manipulation and even coordinated sabotage. The defense must cover not only the large control centers, but also the massively distributed edge of the grid — which falls within the scope of segmentation, monitoring and Pentest.
Where should an operator start?
With the free diagnosis at decripte.com.br/intelligence-center, which maps the operation's exposure and prioritizes where to act — ideally before an incident forces the decision under pressure. To structure the defense, the path continues at decripte.io/start or through a direct conversation at /contato, with the combination of services designed for the size and maturity of each agent.
Sector terms
- OT (Operational Technology)
- The set of systems that monitor and control physical industrial processes — substations, breakers, turbines, pumps. It differs from IT by prioritizing process availability and integrity, and by operating with protocols and equipment that often do not tolerate frequent patches or arbitrary restarts.
- SCADA / ICS
- SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) and ICS (Industrial Control Systems) are the systems that supervise and command the industrial operation, translating decisions into physical commands. They are the most critical asset to protect in an energy operator.
- IEC 62443
- The main international security standard for industrial automation and control systems. It structures the defense into zones and conduits with decreasing levels of trust, serving as the technical reference for the segmentation between IT and OT.
- APT (Advanced Persistent Threat)
- A sophisticated adversary, often state-sponsored, that seeks durable and stealthy network access — living off the land with legitimate tools and valid credentials, with the goal of strategic pre-positioning more than immediate harm.
- Industrial DMZ
- A demilitarized zone that mediates all traffic between corporate IT and the OT environment, ensuring that no packet from the corporate network talks directly to a plant-floor control device.
- ANPD
- National Data Protection Authority, the body responsible for overseeing and regulating the application of the LGPD in Brazil, including the handling of notifications of incidents involving personal data.
Decripte protects and responds to incidents in energy and utilities.
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